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ABSTRACT
On the basis of interviews, observations and archival analysis, this
article explores the controversies surrounding the Yachay project
case in Ecuador and unveils three ideological processes behind its
conception and implementation. First, we show how the new elite
in the government used this project to produce and reproduce a
new power structure using a symbolic strategy based on
propaganda and on an imaginary of techno-scientiﬁc
modernization. Second, we unveil the material and symbolic
reproduction of a cosmopolitan elite of international experts that
proﬁted from the Ecuadorian public funds in exchange for their
name and prestige, thanks to a discourse based on
cosmopolitanism, urgency, and voluntarism. Finally, we explain
how the Yachay project has triggered the reconﬁguration of the
local symbolic sphere according to the new conditions of
reproduction of the world system by reshaping the local
imaginaries around technology and innovation. We conclude that
Yachay, like other similar projects that have emerged at the same
time in other parts of the world, is part of a global process of
reconﬁguration of the ideological and institutional conditions that
accompany the deployment of the latest wave of techno-
economic transformations in the global system.
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1. Introduction
Back in 2010, former president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, and some of his ministers carried
out a diplomatic visit to South Korea, where they got to know the Innopolis Daedeok’s
experience. The impact this visit had on their imaginary could be deemed the origin of
one of the most controversial projects in Ecuadorian techno-scientiﬁc history: Yachay.
Generally translated as “knowledge”, the Kichwa word yachay refers to the essence of
the power of the yachak, the “Andean shaman”. Contrary to the modern notion of knowl-
edge, which designates a system of objectiﬁable and transferable ideas, in its original con-
ception, yachay refers to a process of inalienable, subjective transformation of the
experience of life (Howard 2002, 18). It is a form of “organic knowledge” that cannot be
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learned through the study of texts in any context or at any time (Crickmay 2002, 40). The
yachay can be experienced; it can be “dreamt as a vision” but it cannot be read.
Far from this complex meaning, the Ecuadorian government used the word Yachay as a
project’s brand. Thus, Correa’s government aimed to legitimize and to give an “indigen-
ous” look to a rather classical project of western techno-scientiﬁc development. It
foresaw the construction of a techno-industrial city and a high-level university dedicated
to scientiﬁc research, technological development, and innovation (STI). As the South
Korean experiment unsuccessfully attempted to do 50 years ago in Asia, the Yachay
project aimed to become the “Silicon Valley” of the Andes.
Two public institutions, the SENPLADES1 and the SENESCYT,2 were responsible for the
design and implementation of the project, and to comply with that, both institutions sent
oﬃcials to a training program in the Innopolis Daedeok.
In March 2011, the Ecuadorian government signed an agreement with the Innopolis
Foundation to get advice on the design of Yachay from South Korean experts (Correa
et al. 2011). Later on, Ecuadorian oﬃcials visited similar programs in the United States,
France, Spain, Russia, among others, and signed additional agreements with government
institutions, universities, research centers and companies.
In October 2011, the ﬁrst Yachay project implementation plan was launched. A few
months later, Correa announced that Yachay was to be built on an area of 4500 hectares
on the Urcuqui valley, 120 km north of the capital city, Quito. They projected a total invest-
ment of 1 billion dollars until 2017 and 20 billion dollars until 2030 (Rodríguez 2013).
However, the implementation process did not start until the constitution of Yachay as a
Public Enterprise (YPE) in 2013. The plan foresaw the construction of a city divided into four
zones: university, industrial park, agro-tourism and biotechnology. The university started
functioning in March 2014, with 144 students, 44 professors and researchers from
diﬀerent countries and under the management of a special commission.3 By 2018, Yachay-
Tech University has more than 1000 students and 125 professors. In its short life, diﬀerent
controversies around the functioning of the commission and the university itself have led
to the resignation of ﬁve rectors and the replacement of the entire commission in 2017.
Meanwhile, the YPE was meant to continue the implementation process of the other
components of the project. However, this process stalled for several reasons: a cut in
public funding after the fall of oil prices at the end of 2014, diﬀerent political problems,
the lack of expertise and experience of the Ecuadorian oﬃcials, and the need for political
legitimacy. The last one, in particular, led the former Ecuadorian government to adopt a
strategy centered on propaganda rather than on achieving sustainable and concrete
results. This strategy showed the fragility of the project and raised questions regarding
its feasibility and pertinence. Yachay became a platform for the governments’ political pro-
paganda, used to feed people’s illusion of a techno-economic transformation in order to
obtain public support.
The most pathetic example of this strategy was the public announcement of a 3 billion
dollar investment to build a “mega-factory” of electric cars in Yachay, just one week before
the presidential election (El Telégrafo 2017). This project, which supposedly had the
1Secretaría Nacional de Planiﬁcación y Desarrollo.
2Secretaría de Educación Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación.
3Ares Rosakis (Greece), Guruswami Ravichandran (India), José Andrade (Ecuador) and Fernando Albericio (Spain).
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support of Hewlett-Packard and Tesla Motors, turned out to be a sham invented by the gov-
ernment to get more votes (4pelagatos 2018; Cavagnaro and Santos 2018).
Seven years after its conception, Yachay seems to be trapped in the realm of techno-
dreams. By 2018, the industrial park and the bio-technology zone are still in the planning
stage. The agro-touristic zone was only partially implemented. There are infrastructural
ﬂaws and lack of necessary equipment (El Comercio 2017). Only 40% of the one billion
dollar investment planned by 2017 was executed, and half of this money came from
Chinese credits.
How did we get here? What led Ecuadorian oﬃcials to invest such a large amount of
money, time and resources to build this controversial project? Why did the local criticism
not manage to stop or reshape the project? Why did international experts decide to con-
tribute to and feed this techno-dream? Can we think of this case as a unique Ecuadorian
experience or a global one? We aim to reply to these questions by exploring the contro-
versies surrounding this project and the ideological processes behind its conception and
implementation.
2. Contextual, theoretical and methodological background
Before entering the subject, three points need to be explained.
The ﬁrst one is the context. Ecuador has historically occupied a peripheral position in
the world system as a commodity provider. Relatively more isolated and smaller than
most of its neighbors, the trajectory of the techno-scientiﬁc development of Ecuador
has followed more or less the same patterns of internationalization (Kreimer 2006) and
institutionalization (Arellano, Arvanitis, and Vinck 2012) identiﬁed in the other countries
of the region but in a much less dynamic way. This has led to a marginal integration to
the international techno-scientiﬁc networks and a still very weak internal articulation
and institutionalization. For most of the twentieth century, the development of the local
techno-scientiﬁc ﬁeld has been based mainly on individual and isolated eﬀorts, making
the conﬁguration of a national innovation system (NIS) more a goal than a reality.
Following the institutionalization process that started in the 1970s and the reforms of
the 1990s and 2000s, the Correa’s techno-scientiﬁc policy, of which Yachay is part, aimed
to fortify this proto-system that currently consists of around 60 universities, 13 public
research institutes and another 85 public institutions and NGOs conducting scientiﬁc
and technological activities. The universities have around 36,000 professors (only 8% of
them have a PhD) and half a million undergraduate students (in a country of 16 million
people) from which 85,000 get a diploma every year and 18,000 get a postgraduate
degree (SENESCYT 2017). The system includes approximately 10,000 researchers, most
of which do research part-time. The Research and Development (R&D) expenditures in
2014 reached 0.44% of the GDP, which was twice as much as in 2006 and three times
more than the average in the previous decades, but it is still below the Latin American
average (0.77%) and the UNESCO target of 1% (INEC 2016).
As for the productive sector, Ecuador has around 850,000 registered enterprises and
this number has grown at an average rate of 10% during the last two decades (Schwartz
and Guaipatín 2014; INEC 2017). However, 90.5% of these are micro-enterprises and 7.5%
small enterprises. The remaining 2%, composed of about 12,200 medium and 3,800 large
enterprises, are responsible for 87% of the annual sales. Between 2012 and 2014, half of
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these big and medium-sized enterprises introduced some kind of innovation. However,
just 3% of them were innovations at an international scale and 30% at the national
scale (INEC 2016). Despite some progress in recent years, the productive sector still has
little to oﬀer on the local techno-scientiﬁc level and the productive structure remains
based on commodity exportations and dependent on the importation of industrialized
products.4
A second point is the theoretical approach and the hypothesis underlying our analysis.
Located at the intersection of the works on techno-economical cycles (Schumpeter 1964;
Pérez 1983, 2002, 2009, 2015; Freeman and Louçã 2001) and the global system anthropol-
ogy (Ekholm and Friedman 2008), our interpretation of the Yachay Project case aims to
understand its place in the broader process of global transformations. We understand
this process of transformation from a double perspective. In the ﬁrst place, we follow
the neoschumpeterian arguments on the relations between economical cycles and tech-
nological innovations. Accordingly, the big economic crises of the last three centuries are
closely related with shifts in what Perez calls the “techno-economic paradigm”. As per her
historical analysis, these shifts seem to trigger new waves of innovations every half a
century, changes that are systematically accompanied by parallel transformations within
the institutional and ideological realms. These transformations generally start in speciﬁc
sectors and countries and then progressively spread until reaching saturation or until a
new paradigm breaks through. Therefore, they follow diachronic trajectories among per-
ipheral and central economies. During a ﬁrst phase, the rise of new technologies dislocates
the economy from the institutional and ideological framework and creates the conditions
for a structural crisis. These crises lead to a second phase in which political and ideological
transformations create new frameworks that allow the new paradigm to develop to its full
potential. Along with this line, we suggest that the global crises of 2008 marked the begin-
ning of a new wave of transformations that are helping the ongoing technological revolu-
tion to reshape the economy around the world.5 Our main hypothesis is that the Yachay
project is a local manifestation of this process.
The second approach we use is based on the critiques raised by Ekholm and Friedman
(2008). Therefore, the unit of analysis we use is not a society limited by national-state fron-
tiers, but the global system as a reproductive totality. This means that the economic, pol-
itical and ideological structures, as well as all the processes that support and reproduce
them, transcend the national borders and form a full spectrum of interrelations. This total-
ity has elements, structures, hierarchies and processes, all with diﬀerent temporalities and
spatial inﬂuences. Its empirical manifestation is always locally and temporally circum-
scribed, but its comprehension can only occur at a global scale and from an historical per-
spective. Thus, the material or economic reproduction processes of local societies,
conceptually individualized, are only part of a larger process of total reproduction of the
world system. The focus on the global scale and the long-term processes that characterize
this approach provide a broader understanding of the systemic transformations, which in
4https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/proﬁle/country/ecu/
5Even if closely related to the wave of the 1970s triggered by microchips, computers and telecommunications, this new
techno-economic transformation that began in the 1990s is of a diﬀerent nature. It is virtual and is linked to the creation
of the Web, which allows the public use of Internet, the explosion of the social networks, the big data management and
the development of the ﬁrst forms of artiﬁcial intelligence and the virtual machines, undermining the functioning of most
of the new big companies, the ﬁnancial system and the global economy.
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turn allows us to go beyond the Eurocentric bias of the neo-Schumpeterian scheme and to
explore its implications in peripheral contexts.
Finally, a word on the methodology. Our theoretical approach demands the use of mul-
tisite and long-term data. We draw on data gathered from 2012 to 2016. In-depth inter-
views, participant and non-participant observations and archival analysis were
conducted in Ecuador, France and China. In-depth interviews were conducted with
seven key informants who worked on the Yachay project and in SENESCYT (Ecuador), as
well as several CEOs and project managers of innovation centers and start-ups in
France and China. Non-participant observation was conducted in Yachay, SENESCYT and
in an innovation center in Shanghai. Participant observation was conducted for one
year in Numa, an innovation center in Paris.
First-hand information was complemented with an extensive archival analysis of gray
literature, public documents, and ﬁnancial and statistical information about the techno-
scientiﬁc policy in Ecuador from 1970 to 2016, and about the Yachay project since 2010.
We have also analyzed articles and information published about the project on oﬃcial
websites and in the media between 2010 and 2016.
3. A communication breakdown
The lack of experience and training of most of the oﬃcials in charge of Yachay is prob-
ably one of the main factors explaining the trajectory of this project. The heads of the
project, for example, had no training in STI issues.6 At most, as we found out from the
interviews, some oﬃcials took the 10-day training program on Science and Technology
parks in South Korea. This lack of experience and skills drove local oﬃcials to rely on
Korean expertise and trust them despite the language barrier and resulting lack of
clarity in communication.
I was invited to observe a work meeting between a Yachay project oﬃcial and two Korean
experts from the Innopolis Foundation and from the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and
Technology (KAIST). Both were working at SENESCYT. Two Ecuadorian advisors hired under
the Prometeo7 program were also invited. The purpose was to deﬁne the reference terms of
a consultancy mission for the Yachay techno-industrial park. The two Korean experts
wanted to be hired for this mission. The presentation was quite general: operating principles
of a techno-industrial park, advantages of free-trade zones, and economic liberalization. They
proposed the implementation of a series of reforms in the most classical neoliberal tradition,
contradicting Correa’s oﬃcial discourse, which for the past ﬁve years had supported the popu-
larity of his government. After 40 minutes of presentation, the Ecuadorian oﬃcial surprised
everyone by asking his two counselors to translate the entire presentation into Spanish,
belying only then his lack of comprehension of English. Nonetheless, the rest of the discussion
continued in English, because neither of the Koreans experts could speak Spanish. The
language barrier was serious. The English of the Korean experts was not clear either. Moreover,
the advisor’s translation was very superﬁcial. The project manager seemed to understand
nothing. He started asking questions that his councilor had to translate into English for the
Koreans and vice versa. After a while, the confusion was such that they were no longer
6René Ramírez (SENPLADES 2008-2011 and SENESCYT 2011–2017) did his MA research on social development indicators
and Héctor Rodríguez (SENESCYT 2010-2013 and YPE 2013-2017) did his MA research on indigenous movements and
local governments.
7A post-doctoral program intended to strengthen local universities and research institutes by inviting Ecuadorian and
foreign researchers living abroad.
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talking about the same subject. Neither the project manager nor the Koreans seemed to
realize their misunderstanding. (Field notes, Quito, 23/01/2013)
Beyond exposing the lack of training and language skills, this experience also illustrates
one of the central problems of the Yachay project: its ideological dimension. The com-
munication breakdown between those individuals reveals the existence of a more
general process of symbolic transformation in the world system, of which Yachay is only
a local manifestation. This process can be explained by analogy with another historic
episode, much more widely known: the communication breakdown between the Spa-
niards and the Incan leader Atahualpa, which led to his death.
Howard (2002) used this episode, represented in the play “The tragedy of the end of
Atahualpa” (Lara 1989), to analyze the symbolic colonization process of the Andean
people. The play portrays an Incan man disturbed by the appearance of signals that
seem incomprehensible to him and whose multiplication ends up overtaking his
“yachay”, making him lose his ability to communicate and control his world. These
signals ﬁrst appeared to him in the form of dreams that showed him beings whose
nature and meaning he could not grasp. He then asks his yachak for advice but fails to
follow it. Finally, he must face a reality so strange that the Inca cannot diﬀerentiate it
from a dream. This incapacity ultimately leads to his death.
Despite its metaphorical nature, this piece illustrates how a major rupture in the global
reproduction process can manifest itself locally in the form of a symbolic incompatibility or
a communication breakdown as described above. The Yachay project brought not only
foreign experts, their languages and cultures, but a new symbolic universe together
around technology, economics, politics and culture. This project condenses a series of con-
tradictions found at the crossroads of the indigenous imaginary, used by the government’s
political marketing; the local imaginary of STI; the imaginary formed abroad among the
new elite of students and researchers; the imaginary of Korean, but also Chinese
experts, who deﬁned the project guidelines; and the imaginary of all the other experts
and “gurus” of the new Californian techno-cultural wave who visited or participated in
the project.
Paradoxically, as in the metaphor of Atahualpa, the word Yachay also takes here the
form of a dreamlike vision – that of a high-tech city, which will ﬁnally allow the country
to develop. Is this a premonitory dream announcing a great techno-economic transform-
ation? Or, is it but a form of an ideological dream (Žižek 2008)? As a sort of symptom, the
communication breakdown described here points to the latter.
The following sections reveal the contours of such a dream operating in at least three
interrelated dimensions. First, it has allowed the local elites of a techno-populist regime
(de la Torre 2013) to maintain their privileges and power. Second, in search for legitimacy
in a locally unknown domain, these elites brought in international experts, creating stra-
tegic alliances. This helped this cosmopolitan elite to guarantee or expand their symbolic
and material reproduction by proﬁting from the Ecuadorian public funds in exchange for
their name and prestige. Third, by doing so, local elites became the transmission chains
and the resonance box of the ideas, symbols, and narratives spread by this cosmopolitan
elite around the globe. This triggered the reconﬁguration of the local techno-scientiﬁc
imaginaries according to the new techno-economic paradigm that is reshaping the
world system. This reconﬁguration has been made manifest locally through legal
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reforms, public policies and programs, events, media, cultural products and mega-projects
as Yachay, and triggered diﬀerent forms of local resistance.
4. A remote-controlled white elephant: local elites facing the globalization
process
Yachay was one of the most controversial projects implemented by Correa’s government.
While the feasibility and the very meaning of this project were questioned, the elite in
power adopted a defense strategy based on the internationalization of the STI local
ﬁeld from a wishful thinking perspective. This section analyzes the main criticism raised
against the project. It unveils the tensions introduced by the global transformations in
the reproduction process of the local elites and the ideological role Yachay has played.
For Arturo Villavicencio (2014a; 2014b; 2015; 2016), Yachay was an ideological strategy of
the government to maintain the enthusiasm of the population and to guarantee electoral
support. This strategy used the local imaginary of STI to create an illusion of “hyper-
modern” transformation that would solve all the country’s problems. He criticized the under-
lying linear model of innovation behind the illusion that a city dedicated to R&D could repro-
duce the Silicon Valley experience. This illusion ignored that the success of the Californian
model was based on technology produced by hundreds of research laboratories ﬁnanced
with American public funds and fueled with money from ﬁnancial speculation. Villavicencio
questioned the very possibility that Yachay was capable of becoming the driving force
behind the country’s economic transformation, arguing that high-tech industries are gener-
ally capital-intensive and create very few jobs (Villavicencio and Rodríguez 2015).
Several analysts echoed these arguments, feeding an increasing opposition to the
project.8 This situation worsened with the political and media controversy triggered by
the dismissal of YachayTech’s ﬁrst rector, Fernando Albericio, barely a year after the univer-
sity’s inauguration. Albericio exposed the “irregularities” of the university’s management,
including some unjustiﬁed expenses and the salaries of members of the special commis-
sion – deemed too high for the Ecuadorian context.9 Moreover, he complained to be the
only one living and working full time in Yachay. His colleagues were earning the same
salary while keeping their jobs in California and working remotely for Yachay. Albericio cri-
ticized the commission’s vision and their economic administration (La Historia 2015).
However, his colleagues in California disagreed. They wanted to impose the American
university model and replicate the Caltech or Carnegie Mellon University model. They
accused Albericio of limited management skills and vision. Andrade, the only Ecuadorian
member in the commission, claimed that Ecuador was perfectly capable of developing a
“University of Excellence” in the short term, but that they needed a rector who was able to
lead the University in that direction. The media controversy hurt the image of the project
and the government did not hesitate to give all its support to Andrade, who then tempor-
arily took over the rectorate.
This decision dismissed the complaints and doubts around the project and triggered a
wave of criticism attacking the “messianic” style of the project managers’ discourse and
8See for example: Macias-Vázquez and Alonso-González (2016), Purcell, Fernández, and Martínez (2016), Ledesma and
Cobos (2016) and Carrión and Calva (2016).
9$16,300 per month plus travel and living expenses (more than 40 times the local minimum wage).
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the waste of public resources (Oviedo 2014). According to Hernández (2015), the project
had at least six defects: the imposition of voluntarism over reﬂection and evaluation; the
mystiﬁcation of discourse through symbolic manipulation of the imaginary on technology;
the waste of public resources in order to form a very small elite at an exorbitant cost; the
imposition of the oﬃcial imaginary by annihilating any criticisms to this policy; the disre-
gard for the importance of processes over that of the media show; and the replacement of
organic intellectuals by a technocracy that sees itself as a self-legitimized elite through its
diplomas and technical expertise and who remain faithful to the charismatic leader.
Other researchers questioned the dangers of the elitist, technocratic and authoritarian
rationale of the state and the risks this entailed for the future of the higher education
system (Ortiz 2015; Sierra 2015). Paul Toasa (2015) questioned the media’s attention on
the high salaries of the commissionmembers. In his view, the problemwas the combination
of an excess of “patriotic enthusiasm” and the lack of training or scientiﬁc experience of the
oﬃcials responsible for the project. Santiago Bucaram (2015) focused on the symbolic
dynamic behind the project. For him, Yachaywas an illusion created on thebasis of symbolic
reproductionmechanisms similar to that of the “magic thought”present in the “cargo cults”.
According to his reasoning, this symbolic approach led government oﬃcials to confuse
scientiﬁc, technological or economic development with the acquisition of a large number
of symbols of modernity (“university of excellence”, “world-renowned teachers”, “competi-
tive salaries”, “indexed publications”, “Fablab”, “start-up”, etc.). This misconception about
the techno-economic development problem, he said, will eventually lead to failure.
Mystiﬁcation, elitism, authoritarianism, overspending of economic resources, technoc-
racy and ideological confusion summarize the criticisms against the Yachay project. At
the border between the real and the imaginary, the history of this project shows how a
new elite composed mainly of middle-class intellectuals, bureaucrats and business
people – who accumulated capital and power during Correas’ administration – used the
surplus produced during the expansion phase of the peripheral economic cycle (2007–
2014) to produce and maintain a new power structure. This structure was based on the
instrumentalization and strengthening of the government control over the media, the
Courts, the Assembly, and the use of the public budget for the beneﬁt of their businesses
and political patronage but also to subordinate the elites linked to the ﬁnancial and com-
mercial capital (Basabe and Martínez 2014). This group of elites used a symbolic strategy
based on propaganda and the mobilization of a techno-scientiﬁc modernization imaginary
to justify the policies, actions and programs that let them increase their power. Given the
absence of a local techno-scientiﬁc culture and the weaknesses of the education system,
this symbolic strategy has led to the mystiﬁcation of these imaginaries and their transform-
ation into a kind of ideological device.
The ideological character of this project has been unveiled not only by the symbolic
resistance of its critics but also by the inversion of the trajectory of the peripheral econ-
omic cycle (2014–2017) which showed the limits of the government’s strategy.
However, even if the promised techno-economic transformation has not taken place,
the changes already implemented are very likely to have long-term consequences.
Certain devices introduced into the symbolic reproduction process of local techno-scien-
tiﬁc elites have already started to produce some unexpected eﬀects. These elites, whose
reproduction was previously regulated locally, are now faced with a global reproduction
process. The process of internationalization of the higher education system through the
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scholarship program, the recruitment of foreign teachers and researchers and the adop-
tion of international evaluation parameters are transforming the local techno-scientiﬁc
landscape. In this regard, the debate and criticisms that rose against Yachay can in a
way be interpreted as a local form of resistance to the process of peripheral integration
into the global techno-scientiﬁc system.
This “great white elephant” gives us some clues to understand the relationship between
the transformation processes of the global system, the local cycles of economical, political
and symbolic reproduction and the role of the government’s techno-scientiﬁc transform-
ation strategy.
5. From Mars to Urcuqui: the local reproduction of a global elite
The criticisms analyzed in the previous section have unveiled the ideological nature of this
project and how it was used for the political and economic reproduction of the ruling elite.
This section examines the project promoters’ arguments, whose urgency and cosmopoli-
tanism reveals a second ideological function of this project: justifying the material and
symbolic reproduction of the globalized scientiﬁc elites.
The defense of the project was structured around ﬁve strategies. First, to promote the
image of Yachay as an investment in order to dissolve the idea that it is a waste of money.
Second, to highlight the importance of attracting “international human talent” and creat-
ing links with global techno-scientiﬁc networks. Third, to justify the fact that the members
of this commission work abroad because their function was to raise funds and this task
requires experience and prestige on a global scale (Ecuadorinmediato 2015). Fourth, to
blame the Ecuadorian University for “provincialism” and to, therefore, call for the building
of a “world-class” university by hiring “top level” international experts. Finally, to claim that
the changes needed to happen fast. Creating a new university would ostensibly allow
Ecuador to make a qualitative leap very quickly with visible results in 10–15 years
(Andrade and León 2015).
What is the fear of having a cosmopolitan university? […] The “hyper-provincial” vision of the
higher education system must be stopped […] Albericio’s exit is due to two opposing visions
of university. He believes that we cannot pretend that Ecuador will become California or Mas-
sachusetts. We believe that we can be anything we want. […] Albericio did not think the same
thing […] He wanted to make a university for the children of our children’s children. We want
it to be for our children. (Ramírez and Estrella 2015)
It seems like the origin of the problem lies precisely between these two orientations: cosmo-
politanism and urgency. As Villavicencio argues, the project managers’ lack of experience
led them to want to transpose foreign models to a completely different local reality. More-
over, the government’s urgency tomake visible and immediate changes has overlooked the
fact that there are systemic processes that cannot be shortened. This led to contradictions
between the plans announced and their implementation but also between the principles
that the promoters claim to defend and the actual orientation of the project.
The reaction of the project promoters to these criticisms has been to disqualify any
opponent and to place the debate in the ideological sphere of utopias, personal motiv-
ation, self-conﬁdence, patriotism and faith. José Andrade’s reactions to Albericio’s dismis-
sal is a clear example of this voluntarist and utopian discourse, but taken to an even
galactic scale:
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I’m opening Skype on myMac to connect to a meeting, this time from Barcelona, where I came
to give a lecture on my scientiﬁc research. As usual, NASA’s InSight Scientiﬁc Committee [with
whom I am collaborating] is meeting virtually […]. We are scattered all over the world, but our
mission is outside this world […] I see in NASA’s mission some analogies with YachayTech. As
in this university […], NASA’s mission is led by an international committee that does not live in
Cape Canaveral (where the rockets are launched), or Houston (where they are controlled) and -
of course - even less on Mars (where the mission takes place physically). This committee does
not have an exclusive partnership with NASA, even though they are responsible for launching
a $500 million mission out of American public funds. In Ecuador in the last few weeks, the
debate around the Yachay project has focused on some of these elements […] Why are
public companies like NASA or private companies like Apple and universities like SkolTech
trying to work with people who don’t have an exclusive relationship with them? Are they colo-
nized by snobbery from a group of academic wise men? […] The main reason for the existence
of these committees is precisely their external character […] they bring their global vision and
give an intangible value that attracts investment and human talent for these institutions:
credibility. Without it, it is impossible to institutionalize a new project […] YachayTech’s
model is not snobbish, but pragmatic. (Andrade 2015)
Thus, by using the symbolic capital produced by his collaboration with NASA, Andrade
tries to shift the debate from the local sphere of the “provincial” elites and the problem
of creating a university using public funds to the global sphere of cosmopolitan elites
and the techno-scientiﬁc production and reproduction of the “excellence” of which he
claims to be a part.
How many critics of the YachayTechmodel have run a university or created something new as
we are trying to do now in Ecuador? [The management committee] had a global inﬂuence and
this is transcendental. Because we are not creating a local experience, but a global one.
(Andrade and León 2015)
The problem for him was not about money expenditure or working remotely, but instead
about how he and his colleagues could contribute to the development of the university.
He supported this argument by the fact that they planned to ﬁnance the university with a
model based on investments and donations and for this they needed an international
network.
According to his arguments, the issue of global techno-scientiﬁc reproduction was
essentially a credibility problem. From his perspective, the condition of being a cosmopo-
litan scientist justiﬁed not only working simultaneously in California, in Urcuqui and
perhaps in Elysium Planitia, but above all the fact that the Ecuadorian State had to
ﬁnance its personal project in exchange for inserting the country – or at least an elite
from the country – into the global techno-scientiﬁc network.
Yachay does not want us to be isolated and chained up in Urcuqui, because our activity is not
only in Ecuador, but also in the world. I am a teacher and researcher. I am on the editorial
boards of the best journals in the world. I am a global consultant […] From out of my lab
came companies that have introduced products to the market. This is the work of a world-
renowned scientist. […] The critics who ask [me] to leave all these activities in order to demon-
strate our faith in the project ignore world science. (Andrade 2015)
Hence, Andrade produced a second narrative capable of “keeping the enthusiasm for the
project alive”, in which Yachay acquired a sophisticated symbolic appearance, such as that
of a space mission to Mars. By highlighting the fact that he was able to launch and steer a
robot to another planet, he sent the illusion around the dream of techno-scientiﬁc
TAPUYA: LATIN AMERICAN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 247
development embodied by Yachay into the stars. The voluntarist mantra “If we want to, we
can” resonates in Andrade’s speech.
To create a new product, we need people, human talents, who believe that they can change
the world. YachayTech does that with its students. We implant in them the chip of innovation,
the idea that anything is possible. (Andrade and León 2015)
With this rationale, Yachay’s greatest challenge was not the material but the cultural con-
straints. According to Andrade, the most important change to be implemented was the
creation of a culture of innovation, entrepreneurship and risk-taking in the country. The
challenge of trying to build a “cosmopolitan university” with “world-class” researchers
and teachers capable of developing nanotechnology, artiﬁcial intelligence or “conquering
space if necessary” was, in a way, an attempt to put their discourse into practice. They had
created their technological dream and were now trying to prove that they were capable of
manifesting it.
This process will have medium-term results when the ﬁrst students ﬁnish their studies and
become the new leaders. […]. The ﬁrst technologies will come out in 5 or 10 years and we
will have the ﬁrst PhDs trained in Ecuador and they will create new Ecuadorian technology
companies. The new horizon is set at 15 years, when we will have our own Google or a
new Whatsapp. (El Telégrafo 2015)
However, this “inspiring talk” could not dispel criticism. The seemingly inexhaustible
ﬂow of public resources closed abruptly after the fall in oil prices at the end of 2014.
This undermined the functioning of the university, which delayed the construction of
several infrastructures, the installation of equipment, and the recruitment of teachers
and researchers.
6. Between an Asian ﬂu and the new California fever
Previous sections unveiled the symbolic tissue surrounding this “enterprise”, which allows
us to identify the main points of controversy and the various arguments raised by multiple
actors. Based on this analysis, we suggested that this project has served as an ideological
device used to guarantee the reproduction of the local elites linked to the government
and certain cosmopolitan elites at a global scale. This section explores another function
of this ideological device: the internationalization of the Ecuadorian techno-scientiﬁc
system. We see this process as the local manifestation of a global transformation, which
includes the change of the techno-economic paradigm and the shift of the global hege-
mony (Pérez 2002; Ekholm and Friedman 2008).
Yachay condenses diﬀerent imaginaries whose evolution reﬂects the process of reconﬁ-
guration of the world system. The analysis of the discourses around the project shows an
evolution of the language, conceptions and symbols mobilized during the last seven years.
This evolution and the juxtaposition of symbols and discourses responds to the inﬂuence
of the various actors who contributed to the project in its diﬀerent stages, but also to the
general inﬂuence of the new techno-economic paradigm whose deployment started after
the 2007–2008 crisis.
The inﬂuence of Korean experts, for example, determined the design of a project under
a model already considered obsolete (Villavicencio 2014a, 206). Indeed, the idea of build-
ing cities and techno-scientiﬁc parks of this kind has already experienced at least four
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waves since the 1950s.10 The same Innopolis Daedeok was one of the experiments that
started in the 1970s. Paradoxically, at its origin, we ﬁnd the failure of a project whose
resemblance with Yachay oﬀers up some elements not to be neglected.
Originally called Daedeok Science Town, this project was part of a long-term techno-
scientiﬁc development plan elaborated in 1968. Like Yachay, Daedeok’s creation was
inﬂuenced by experts from experiences that preceded it, notably those of Novosibirsk,
Tsukuba, RTP and Silicon Valley (Lee and Kim 2016). Similar to Yachay, the “master plan”
foresaw an “ambitious”, “avant-garde” and “ecological” urban design. Its construction
was delayed until 1974, but also like Yachay, an oil-related crisis cut oﬀ the project’s
funding and forced oﬃcials to revise the project, lower targets and extend deadlines
under new budgetary conditions. The infrastructure was not completed until 1992.
According to Lee and Kim (2016), during these two decades the Daedeok Science Town
project was a state-run island with no links to local actors, very weak ties to the productive
sector and few entrepreneurial activities.
Only in 1997 did the park change direction: it was reoriented towards commercializa-
tion and technological innovation and changed its name to Daedeok Valley. The govern-
ment’s political and ﬁnancial support during this period boosted entrepreneurship at
the local level. However, the eﬀect of this boom was limited due to the high costs of tech-
nology transfer and the lack of evaluation policies.
The relative failure of this second experiment led to a new conﬁguration in 2005, aimed
at positioning it internationally as a “world-class innovative cluster” (Innopolis Foundation
2005). Renamed Daedeok Innopolis, the park was forced to strengthen its interactions with
local businesses while beginning to develop activities on an international scale.
In 2008, the Science and Technology Park training program was created to share and
promote Innopolis’ experience and model to manage techno-scientiﬁc parks, with the aim
of oﬀering consulting and cooperation services to countries wishing to develop such projects
(Innopolis Foundation 2014). It was precisely in this program that the Ecuadorian oﬃcials who
started the Yachayprojectwere trained. From2010 onwards, Innopolisbegan an international
marketing campaign to sell “techno-scientiﬁc parks” and through the Korea Innovation Cluster
Foundation signed two agreements to export the Innopolis model: one in Ecuador, which
became the Yachay project, and a second one in Kazakhstan.11
It was on the basis of this rather erratic trajectory and its questionable success that the
Korean advisers deﬁned the guidelines of the Yachay project. These guidelines led the
Ecuadorian project managers to make decisions in an area that was foreign to them. More-
over, the similarities of the Yachay project with Daedoek’s ﬁrst model, which the same
Koreans failed to set up, make it appear as if these experts hadn’t read their own
history. The consequences of the Korean failure are, in fact, a warning about the possible
challenges that Yachay will have to face in a few years.
For Ecuador, this project represented the equivalent of roads, railways, power plants or
telecommunications networks that brought about the previous waves of global techno-
economic transformation. In the imaginary of policy-makers, Yachay was the “infrastructure”
10Silicon Valley (USA 1950s), Research Triangle Park – RTP (USA 1959), Akademgorodok à Novosibirsk (RUS 1960s), Tsukuba
(JAP 1960s), Boston Highway 128 (USA 1970s), Daedok (KOR 1970s), Sophia-Antipolis (FRA 1970s), Cambrigde (GBR 1970s),
Kansi (JAP 1980s), Hsinchu (TWN 1980), Technopolis (JAP 1980s), Cartuja’93 (ESP 1990), Multifunction Polis (AUS-JAP 1990)
(Castells and Hall 1994).
11The Korea-Kazakhstan Technology Cooperation Center (KKTCC) out of business since 2012 (KKTCC 2012).
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needed to rise in the wave of the cognitive economy that emerges with this new cycle of
systemic transformation. For the Korean consultants, it was most likely a successful business
transaction of Korea’s new industry: techno-dreams (Castells and Hall 1994, 8).
The Korean experts were not the only ones involved in the symbolic production process
of this project. Indeed, the inﬂuence of American, European and Latin American actors was
also fundamental: experts from Caltech and other American and European universities;
foreign academics hired directly by Yachay or under the Prometeo program; and above
all, the various speakers invited by Yachay at numerous events organized since 2013,
including several innovation “gurus” such as Steve Wozniak (Apple), Jeremy Abbett
(Google) or Jonathan Medved (OurCrowd).
While the inﬂuence of these actors was not able to change the overall design of the
project, they somehow shifted the imaginary of policy makers from a traditional linear
innovation model to a more systemic model inspired by the new trends in Silicon Valley.
However, given the constraints imposed by the choice of building a new city rather
than strengthening the growth nodes of an already existing system, this evolution of dis-
course is in permanent contradiction with what gets put into practice. They thus mobilize a
series of catchwords of the new wave of the “California fever": innovation ecosystem,
camp, start-up, incubators, coworking, accelerators, angels, big data, hackathons, open
source, crowdfunding, etc. without having a substrate that gives concrete content to
these signiﬁers and without physical or social signiﬁcance. This allows them to give a van-
guard look to harmless practices or create mirages where there is nothing but wind. A day
laborer can hereby become a “freelancer”, the local grocery store a “start-up” and 700
bureaucrats an “innovation ecosystem”.
Thus, Yachay serves to channel, transmit or amplify these symbolic currents associated
with the reconﬁguration process of theworld system, fulﬁlling the third ideological function:
to strengthen the internationalization process of the local techno-scientiﬁc ﬁeld through
the reconﬁguration of the local symbolic sphere according to the new reproduction con-
ditions of the global system. Thanks to this function, ideas such as self-entrepreneurship,
ﬂexibility, freelancing, start-ups, crowdfunding, universal wages, etc. enter the symbolic
“current” of peripheral zones, weaken the old symbolic structures linked to wage earners,
social security and even capital, “viralize” themselves and create the conditions for the reor-
ganization of the material reproduction process. As this process comes to an end, it makes
more and more sense for us to set up a channel on YouTube, register our car on Uber, our
house on Airbnb and ourselves on Tinder, than to look for a permanent job, join a union,
save for retirement or meet people at the local bar. This new symbolic conﬁguration is
the code contained in the chip of “innovation, entrepreneurship and risk”, which Andrade’s
inspiring talk said he wanted to implant in the minds of Yachay students.
This phenomenon does not seem to be exclusive to a peripheral country like Ecuador.
Data from complementary ﬁeldwork carried out in France and China revealed that these
kind of projects associated with innovation have played a central role in transmitting and
reproducing the imaginary conveyed by the new techno-economic paradigm that has
been unfolding since the 2007–2008 crisis.
In Paris, the Numa12 center is one of the main spots for meeting and disseminating Cali-
fornia’s new techno-entrepreneurial culture. It is not insigniﬁcant that the association
12This name is a mix between the French words “numerique” and “human” aiming to mean “digital human”.
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behind this project is called Silicon Sentier and Google is one of its partners. Created in 2000
by a group of entrepreneurs from the digital sector in Paris, many of whom had experience
in the United States, their goal was to promote entrepreneurship and support small, inno-
vative businesses. However, it was only in 2008, precisely at the start of the crisis, that they
opened the ﬁrst co-working space in France –La Cantine– and in 2011, the ﬁrst company
accelerator, Le Camping (NUMA 2013).
Since we started our ﬁeldwork at the end of 2013, the number of co-working spaces,
incubators, accelerators and other innovation centers in Paris and around the world has
skyrocketed. NUMA also opened new innovation centers between 2015 and 2016 in Ban-
galore, Casablanca, Moscow, Barcelona and Mexico City. Looking ahead, the Skolkovo and
Innopolis projects in Russia, Masdar in the Arab Emirates, Konza in Kenya and Yachay in
Ecuador, although inspired by a model that seems obsolete today, are part of the same
wave of reconﬁguration of the global technological landscape.
This phenomenon of global “viralization” of this type of place shows the scale and speed
of this process of general reconﬁguration of the symbolic sphere of the global system. This
reconﬁguration, of which the GAFA and other Silicon Valley “unicorns” such as Uber or Airbnb
are the focal point of contagion, is changing not only our imaginaries and the way we look at
the world, but also the process of material reproduction itself. Ultimately, what is changing is
the way capital is reproduced and its relationship to labor. In this sense, not only Yachay, but
all these “environments” associated with technological innovation around the world consti-
tute a kind of ideological device whose function is to prepare the symbolic ground for the
deployment of the new techno-economic paradigm that is underway.
Interestingly, China seems to be the only place – to our knowledge – that despite the
symptoms has not developed this Californian fever. They do not dream of producing tech-
nology – they’re already doing it. This gives them a privileged position to use the global
capital reproduction process, because they do not suﬀer from techno-hallucinations
obscuring their gaze. They know, use and manufacture the symbols that give substance
to other people’s hallucinations, but they do so without losing sight of their main objec-
tive: to accumulate capital. Whether we are trying to set up a drones start-up in Yachay, or
to develop a mobile application for extramarital dating in Paris or to sell some bitcoins in
London, sooner or later we will all have to pay a supplier in China for chips, phones or bits.
The interview with Joseph, the director of one of these innovation centers in Shanghai,
illustrates a pragmatic tendency to assimilate the ongoing transformation.
“The start-up market is not lucrative because they are very naïve.” Joseph was looking for more
proﬁtable companies. He explained that in Shanghai there were several spaces like this one, but
that they were very small and most of them belonged to the government. He decided to create
this space to sell his consulting services with his network of investors. I asked him if there were
any companies that managed to get oﬀ the ground and he answered, “Honestly, they have not.
Only one managed to raise money, but no more than that”. […] For him, start-ups were just a
“trend”, not more than “blah-blah”. He conﬁded to me that he was using the televisions that
were behind me to channel “TED talks” all day long. His goal was to “inspire” the young
people who work in his space so that they believe that they will succeed in setting up their
businesses and continue to use his services. However, for him, these “inspirational talks” were
just “Western propaganda” that made no sense in China. (Field notes, Shanghai, 8 July 2014)
Unlike the Korean discourse which had succeeded in selling an outmoded technological
dream to the Ecuadorian government, and the “inspiring talks” of California model
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gurus who are extending their networks and the new techno-economic paradigm around
the world, the discourse of Chinese actors in the face of these symbolic transformations
remains pragmatic and direct: with or without the technological glitter, “business is
business”. It is in the interaction of these three symbolic but geographically based
realms that the transformation of the world reproduction process has begun in recent
years. The resulting unwinding of tensions and contradictions will deﬁne the new hege-
monic conﬁguration of the world system in the coming years.
In the case of Yachay, these tensions shifted towards Chinese pragmatism. Indeed, it
was not the “inspiring talks” of the project managers that ultimately secured the
ﬁnancing to continue the project, but the pure and simple greed of the Chinese
bankers and subcontractors who knew how to seize a “good business opportunity”.
7. Conclusion
Yachay is still far from becoming the hearth of the Ecuadorian techno-economic trans-
formation for which it was created. Several economical, political and ideological factors
have undermined its implementation. This article has focused on the latter: the ideological
factors. Based on the analysis of the discourses and controversies surrounding this project,
we have identiﬁed the main criticisms that rose against it, but also the main arguments
and strategies used to defend it.
The analysis of these arguments, strategies and criticisms has led us to conclude that
Yachay has been conﬁgured as an ideological device with a triple function: ﬁrst, the pol-
itical and material reproduction of the local elites in the government; second, the material
and symbolic reproduction of a cosmopolitan elite of international experts that have par-
ticipated and proﬁted from this project; and third, the reconﬁguration of the local symbolic
sphere to enable the diﬀusion of the new techno-economic conditions brought on by the
ongoing global transformations.
The internationalization of the STI local ﬁeld is, therefore, the result of the interaction
of these ideological functions. Like other similar projects that have emerged recently
in other parts of the world, Yachay turned out to be a peripheral manifestation of this
global process.
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